Henry Graff Blog 2

 Henry Graff

International Politics

Blog 2

Despite evoking incredible national support upon its launch, our invasion of Afghanistan has developed into something we were seemingly unprepared for. In order to make somebody pay for their actions against the American people, President Bush’s offensive aimed to eradicate al-Qaeda in the newly proclaimed “war against terror”. These initial intentions are very important when thinking about our involvement in the Middle East, as the situation is incredibly dynamic and increasingly complex. When asked today about our aid in the Middle East, most would likely attribute it to our attempted government building. This, however, was not always the case. As Boot demonstrates in Twenty years of Afghanistan mistakes, but this preventable disaster is on Biden, there is a trail of mistakes made by many U.S. Presidents. One aspect of this is the inconclusiveness of why we were there at any given point. Boot begins by stating Bush’s error in “failing to focus on building a capable Afghan government and military - and instead, pivoting scarce resources to a war of choice in Iraq” (Boot). President Obama’s troop surge and President Trump’s failed negotiations also failed to create any progress, further contributing to the problem (Boot). Finally, Biden “has bumbled in hewing to Trump’s deal even though the Taliban did not” (Boot). These quotes shine a light on just how mishandled the situation in the Middle East has been. Unfortunately, as proposed by Grossman in his fittingly titled piece, Every Option in Afghanistan Was Bad. He states that there are two interpretations of the situation on Afghanistan, one being their “government couldn’t stand on its own” and it “would’ve happened whenever the U.S. pulled out”, and the other being that “allied efforts clearly made a difference, keeping the Taliban at bay and a better government in power” (Grossman 2). This brings up the question, however, of what we were there to do. The public is largely against keeping troops there, as the threat is both indirect and scarce. To them, not being able to “hand over full responsibility to Afghans for the foreseeable future meant staying there was pointless” (2). As Grossman explains, however, America “was achieving its original goal of preventing Afghanistan frmo becoming a base to launch terrorist attacks against the U.S. and American allies” (2). Interestingly, there are seemingly contrasts between the peoples’ views and our countries' principles, as well as the intentions of our foreign intervention in Afghanistan over time. Grossman goes on to propose how the United States should have more efficiently prepared and enacted withdrawal, as we left when “the government was ineffective and corrupt, which undermined military and police morale” (4). The incredibly poor conditions of Afghan authority to oppose the Taliban were simply not enough to keep them at bay after American departure. As described, American presence in Afghanistan does create a better state, “helping millions of Afghans, especially women, girls, and LGBT people, live free of fundamentalist repression” (2). The question becomes whether it is worth losing American lives overseas to reap some unknown and unpromised benefit. Consequently, we have traditionally been allocating our resources inefficiently, as in 2012, President Obama announced that “We are now able to transition out of Afghanistan in a responsible way” (3). This statement, along with many others from the time, characterized American policymaker's agenda to push a narrative that “the Afghan government would maintain security without assistance” (3). Given the development of circumstances in even more recent years, it is questionable what our motives and speculations were. Either way, it has simply been a “disaster that was produced by four administrations” (Boot).